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Abstract. The article substantiates the idea that in-
creasing social inequality and persistent large-scale 
poverty in post-Soviet Russia should be considered as 
one of the main reasons for the low birth rate in the 
country and a serious challenge to ensuring its demo-
graphic security. The authors propose a concept of 
demographic security and outline its primary indica-
tors and their threshold values—the methodological 
basis for diagnosing and forecasting demographic 
processes from the perspective of Russia’s national 
and economic security. The authors analyzed the in-
fluence of excessive social inequality on the de-
mographics in the country for the period from 1990 to 
2018. The authors used a step-by-step analysis algo-
rithm and built a multiple regression equation that 
reflects the impact of various socio-economic factors, 
including excessive inequality and deformation of 
people’s social behavior, on life expectancy. The equa-
tion has a high explanatory power (the adjusted coef-
ficient of determination isṜ2= 0.914).Thus, it can be 
used as the methodological basis when proposing 
measures for maintaining and increasing life potential 
of society that is an optimal solution for ensuring de-
mographic security in present conditions. The study 
presents recommendations on the development of an 
active national socio-economic policy aimed at over-
coming excessive social inequality in Russia and en-
suring its demographic security. 
Keywords: demographic potential of the country, demo-
graphic security, social inequality, relative and absolute 
poverty, supply chain strategy, indicators of demograph-
ic dynamics, life expect ancyat birth, life potential of 
society, functional fertility borders, demographic tax, 
social contract. 
1. Introduction  
1.1 Introducing the Problem 
The problems associated with studying and ensur-
ing the demographic security of Russia and its re-
gions are becoming increasingly important since 
the end of the 20th and the early 21st century, and 
there is a good reason for it. “Demographic securi-
ty” is not an abstract or opportunistic concept, but it 
is directly linked with the concept of “national se-
curity” that has become one of social priorities and 
an integral part of the domestic and foreign policy 
of the United States and other countries. Consider-
ing the interconnection of the country’s demo-
graphic potential (in other words, its population) 
with the growth of the real national income, one 
can say that maintaining and increasing the coun-
try’s population are among the main conditions for 
ensuring its socio-economic security [1]. Consider-
ing the above, demographic security can be defined 
as such a state of a country’s demographic potential 
and all its aspects that enables the continuous natu-
ral renewal of generations and life security even 
under adverse internal and external conditions. 
From this perspective, demographic security is the 
most important indicator of socio-economic, politi-
cal and ethnic development of the country (region). 
Russia has traditionally assumed that its demo-
graphic potential is very high. It grew particularly 
fast in the 19th century, and by 1897 estimated 
about 4% of the world population [2]. The average 
annual population of Russia reached its maximum 
in 1992(148.7 million people), and in 2017 it esti-
mated 146.8 (including the population of the Re-
public of Crimea). The country today accounts for 
1.9% of the world population. It should be noted 
that the natural population growth observed in Rus-
sia in the past has been replaced by a natural de-
crease since 1992, which is not covered by increas-
ing migration. Considering the obvious discrepancy 
between Russian population today and the size of 
its territory, the length of its borders, huge spaces 
that should be developed, as well as its proximity to 
densely populated states (some of them occasional-
ly put forward claims on Russian territory), the 
current demographic situation should be seen as a 
serious challenge to the national and geopolitical 
interests of the country. To deal with it, it is neces-
sary to research the main directions and mecha-
nisms of demographic policy and to develop a 
strategy for the near and distant future. It should be ______________________________________________________________ 
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said that even today, when the Russian government 
pays great attention to solving demographic prob-
lems, judging by the measures taken (introducing 
the maternity capital, increasing child benefits, 
promoting healthy lifestyle, and repatriation pro-
grams), the state policy in this area is still incon-
sistent, not of systemic or comprehensive nature, 
since it often fails to take into account various so-
cio-economic and socio-psychological factors, as 
well as mechanisms underlying the observed de-
mographic processes [3]. In this case, according to 
well-known American scientist W.E. Deming, “... 
events that at first sight or by common sense should 
have had a positive effect often do not lead to the 
desired result, and sometimes systematically reduce 
the control targets”[4]. Against this background, it 
is crucial to explore the impact various socio-
economic factors and social institutions on demo-
graphic dynamics. Social inequality and poverty 
are among the most important ones since their “in-
fluence on the demographic dynamics can be com-
pared with the impact of such systemic factors as 
climate or ecology on the development and func-
tioning of biological organisms” [3]. 
1.2 The Importance of the Problem 
In the beginning of the 21st century all countries, 
including Russia, experienced rapid differentiation 
of real incomes and consumption, which resulted in 
a sharp increase in social inequality, “... a huge gap 
between poverty and wealth, isolating the “golden 
billion” countries from the rest of the world regard-
ing their economic development and income, and 
the growth of internal non-equality” [5]. Today, we 
can observe a persistent negative trend when a 
small group owns an increasingly larger share of 
world wealth. According to the experts of Swiss 
financial company Credit Suisse, 1% of the richest 
people owned 50.8% of world wealth in 
2016,compared 45.8% in 2012, and 48% in 2014 
[6]. However, in 2017, according to the report “An 
Economy for the 99%,” the total wealth of 50% of 
the world population equaled that of the eight rich-
est people on the planet [7]. According to WID. 
world, in 2016 incomes of the richest 10% estimat-
ed: 76% in the USA, in China—66%, in France–
53%, and in the Russian Federation—87% [8]. So-
cial inequality has reached a catastrophically high 
level in modern Russia. This statement is con-
firmed, for example, by the ratio of average per 
capita incomes of the richest 10% and the poorest 
10%, which in 2016 estimated 15.6 times compared 
to 3 times in the USSR, 5–6 times in Japan, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Finland, Sweden and 
Norway, 7–9 times in Belarus, Bulgaria, Kazakh-
stan, Poland, Switzerland, France, Germany, Cana-
da and India, and 10–11 times in Italy and Spain 
[9]. As world experience shows, the range of ra-
tional (optimal) values for this indicator is 6–12 
times [1]. A major indicator of inequality, the Gini 
index, which reflects distribution of total income, 
increased from 0.289 in 1992 to 0.412 in 2017, 
exceeding the critical value for this indicator by 
30–40% [10]. It should be mentioned that in coun-
tries with a social market economy (Sweden, the 
Netherlands, and Denmark) the value of this indica-
tor is 0.30 or less, while in Great Britain and France 
it estimates 0.33 [5]. Such distribution of income 
and wealth resulted in a huge number of poor peo-
ple. According to the World Bank, in 2017, in Rus-
sia13.3% had cash incomes below the subsistence 
minimum (while the maximum permissible value 
of this indicator is 7.0%). According to the Europe-
an poverty line (60% of the median income), the 
level of poverty in the whole population reached 
21.3%, and among families with children—
26.5%(in comparison, in the EU countries, the 
share of the poor according to this criterionin 2017 
estimated 16.9%). These factual data prove that in 
modern Russia inequality is not just high, but ex-
cessive, especially when compared with the lead-
ing European countries. Such a situation leads to a 
so-called “poverty trap”, in which people lose mo-
tivation to economic activity, including labor. They 
become more dependent and inert, the quality of 
human reproduction decreases, and its transfor-
mation into human capital is hindered [11, 12, 13, 
14]. Here it should be noted that as early as 2006, 
the World Bank drew public attention to inequality 
and poverty in the debates on human development, 
economic growth, new global effects of inequality 
on the demographic dynamics and the quality of 
human potential [15]. 
1.3LiteratureReview 
Today, the problem of increasing social inequality 
and poverty has become one of the major ones for 
global economics (as well as sociology, political 
science, psychology, etc.). The growing interest of 
the scientific community and politicians to this 
issue is connected with the search for the optimal 
(normal) level of inequality that can help overcome 
some steady negative trends (primarily, incomes 
polarization and an increasing gap in society, con-
centration of capital and wealth in the hands of ever 
more narrow groups, persistent large-scale poverty, 
etc.). Solving these issues would facilitate econom-
ic growth and/or help achieve greater social justice. 
For instance, in his book “Capital in the Twenty-
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First Century” (2015), French economist T. Piketty 
calls high inequality the fundamental contradiction 
of capitalism. He writes: “Inequality ... means that 
recapitalization of property accumulated in the past 
occurs faster than production and wages growth. 
This inequality reflects a fundamental logical con-
tradiction” [16] .D. Dorling emphasizes that “more 
babies survive in countries with higher equality, 
and people there in general are healthier and happi-
er. Equality pays “dividends” at all stages of human 
life, from childhood to old age” [17]. The works of 
[18], [19], and [11, 12] make one ponder on the 
economic, social, political and other consequences 
of excessive inequality in the 21st century and are 
based on different interpretations of the hypothet-
ical curve [20]. These studies represent current the-
oretical and methodological basis for further study 
of inequality and the mechanisms of its influence 
on other socio-economic processes, including de-
mographic dynamics. From our perspective, when 
assessing inequality and poverty today, the most 
common theoretical approaches to this problem are 
the deprivation approach and the concept of func-
tional capabilities that were profoundly developed 
by British economist [21]. He used the expert 
method to create a list of “deprivations” acting as 
signs of poverty. Later, [22] adjusted this list after a 
survey of households. The concept developed by 
Nobel laureate [23] implies that human well-being 
is associated not with utility or a set of consumer 
goods that they have, but with a set of their func-
tional capabilities. According to the scientist, “just 
as the budget size in the product space represents 
the freedom of an individual to buy consumer 
goods, the “set of capabilities” in the function 
space reflects the individual’s freedom to choose a 
lifestyle” [24]. In addition to the above approaches, 
when determining the poverty line scientists use 
such well-known competing concepts as absolute, 
relative and subjective poverty. Their combination 
allows one to construct a multi-criteria poverty line 
[13, 25]. At the same time, modern researchers are 
paying less attention to the study of the impact of 
inequality and poverty on demographic dynamics. 
What is more, research results are often fragmented 
and controversial. In this regard one should men-
tion the works of Russian scientists [26] with a 
detailed analysis of statistical data on demographic 
indicators. However, the authors do not provide 




1.4. Stating the Hypothesis 
A working scientific hypothesis of this study im-
plies accepting that excessive social inequality and 
large-scale poverty have aprofound and systemic 
effect on the dynamics of fundamental demograph-
ic indicators (birth and death rates and life expec-
tancy at birth) in modern Russia. The elimination 
of excessive social inequality is the most important 
factor in ensuring the demographic security in Rus-
sia. 
2. Method 
The hypothesis about the effect of excessive 
inequality and large-scale poverty on the de-
mographic dynamics and ensuring demograph-
ic security was tested with a range of methods: 
2.1. Database building 
 (Representative statistical samples and collecting 
the required statistical data) which included:  
 time series (population size, the birth 
and death rates, natural population growth, life ex-
pectancy at birth, total migration, the share of 
population with incomes below the subsistence 
minimum, and the distribution of total cash in-
comes by 20% population groups)with the statisti-
cal data of the Russian Federation for the period 
from 1990 to 2017; 
 panel data of Russia’s regional statis-
tics for the period from 2013 to 2017 (380 observa-
tions, 24 factors) characterizing the dynamics of 
economic development, education, health care, 
ecological environment, as well as the dynamics of 
excessive inequality and the deformation of social 
behavior in Russia’s regions; 
 spatial data characterizing the average 
life expectancy in 2017 and the global dynamics of 
the main indicators of socio-economic inequality 
for the period from 1990 to 2017. 
2.2. Intelligent data analysis  
(Data Mining) performed with Statistica software 
(http://statsoft.ru) that included:  
 factor analysis of data with subsequent 
grouping (classification), building the main com-
ponents (integral indices) characterizing indicators 
of economic development, ecological environment, 
social inequality, deformation of social behavior, 
education and health care; 
 modeling of the main components as 
linear combinations of normalized exogenous vari-
ables reflecting latent core characteristics of each of 
the groups; 
 constructing a multiple linear regres-
sion equation for the main components using an 
algorithm of step-by-step analysis to identify the 
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data structure, the relationships between variables 
(their classification and reduction), as well as to 
reduce the correlation between the explained varia-
bles and minimizing the risk of losing factors statis-
tically insignificant in a t-test; 
 Verification of the constructed models 
using the adjusted coefficient of determination, 
testing the statistical hypothesis about the reliability 
of the regression according to the F-test, testing the 
statistical hypothesis about the reliability of the 
regression parameter estimates according to the t-
test. 
In this research, we used the data published on the 
website of the Federal State Statistics Service of the 
Russian Federation (http://www.gks.ru) and various 
international databases (Eurostat 
2019.http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/eu
ropean-union-statistics-onincome-and-
livingconditions) and others. 
3. Results 
We found that the effect of inequality on the demo-
graphic dynamics manifests itself in two opposite 
ways. On the one hand, the possibility of achieving 
high incomes and consumer standards has a posi-
tive effect allowing the person to realize his social 
and demographic functions (A. Sen calls them 
“functional capabilities”), including reproductive 
behavior. On the other hand, inequality expressed 
through “deprivations” of large groups of popula-
tion, when people feel hopeless about their socio-
economic situation since they cannot improve it 
themselves. Such a situation undermines the moti-
vation of social behavior and has a devastating ef-
fect on health, the birth rate and average life expec-
tancy in the country, that is, on the fundamental 
elements of demographic security. It is clear that in 
the situation of great social inequality and high 
absolute poverty, the phenomenon under study will 
have primarily negative influence on the demo-
graphic situation in the country. A comprehensive 
analysis of the population reproduction in Russia 
for the period from 1990 to 2018 included studying 
the dynamics of natural growth rates, total and ag-
gregate birth and death rates. We revealed long-
term dynamics of natural population decline (Fig. 
1). Only for the period from 2000 to 2018 natural 
decline estimated 7.8 million people (about 433 
thousand people on average per year). 
 
Figure1. The dynamics of the main demographic indicators in Russia for 2005–2018. 
The main reason for this situation is a drop in the 
birth rate compared with 1990 that can be observed 
over the entire analyzed period. This is evidenced by 
the dynamics of the aggregate fertility rate (the num-
ber of births per 1000 people) and the total fertility 
rate (per 1 woman). In the postwar year of 1950 the 
total fertility rate for Russia’s population was 2.8, 
whereas in 1990 it dropped to 1.89 and, despite 
measures taken by the Government of the Russian 
Federation to stimulate fertility in the country, in 
2007–2018 it did not reach the threshold value re-
quired forincreasing reproduction (2.15–2.17) or the 
level of 1990 (Table 1). In other words, for many 
years Russia has had the birth rate insufficient even 
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Table1. Changes in the population of Russia in 1990–2018. 
Year Indicator 
Per 1000 people Total fertility rate, 
children per woman 
Migration growth, 
people Born Dead Naturalincrease 
1990 13.4 11.2 2.2 1.892 456062 
1995 9.3 15.0 –5.7 1.337 603198 
2000 8.7 15.3 –6.6 1.195 241755 
2001 9.0 15.6 –6.6 1.223 81781 
2002 9.7 16.2 –6.5 1.286 87149 
2003 10.2 16.4 –6.2 1.319 43884 
2004 10.4 15.9 –5.5 1.344 41275 
2005 10.2 16.1 –5.9 1.294 107432 
2006 10.3 15.1 –4.8 1.305 132319 
2007 11.3 14.6 –3.3 1.416 239943 
2008 12.0 14.5 –2.5 1.502 242106 
2009 12.3 14.1 –1.8 1.542 247449 
2010 12.5 14.2 –1.7 1.567 158078 
2011 12.6 13.5 –0.9 1.582 319761 
2012 13.3 13.3 0.0 1.691 294930 
2013 13.2 13.0 0.2 1.707 295859 
2014 13.3 13.1 0.2 1.750 299990 
2015 13.3 13.0 0.3 1.777 245384 
2016 12.9 12.9 –0.01 1.762 261948 
2017 11.5 12.4 –0.9 1.621 211878 
2018 10.9 12.5 –1.6 1.579 124854 
There are many reasons for the decline in the birth 
rate (low cash income of many families, lack of nor-
mal housing conditions, an increase in the number of 
single-parent families, etc.). However, in conditions 
of excessive inequality and poverty (see Section 1.2.), 
the main reason for such dynamics in the birth rate, in 
our opinion, is the inadequate compensation of dis-
posable income compared to the functional boundary 
for birth (long-term income during the period of up-
bringing children). The death rate is the second com-
ponent of natural population growth. Judging by the 
data in Table 1, in Russia in 1990 the total death rate 
per 1000 people per year was 11.2, whereas in 2000 it 
estimated 15.3 people, in 2005—16.1, and in 2018—
12.5 people. At the same time, the threshold value 
should not exceedeight people with a steady birth 
rate. In a situation of excessive social inequality, a 
high death rate can be explained by the high morbidi-
ty rate, deformation of social behavior (increasing 
alcohol and drug addiction, smoking, suicide and 
homicide), as well as lack of leisure activities pro-
moting a healthy lifestyle. It should be mentioned 
that a natural decline in the population of Russia over 
the analyzed period was only partially covered by 
migration growth. In addition to those considered 
above, the demographic security of the country is 
assessed with the indicator of life expectancy at birth 
(average life expectancy). At the present stage of 
social development, threshold values for this indica-
tor are directly connected with the development of 
world economies over the past two decades and 
should estimate at least 75 years old [1]. All leading 
world economies have an outstanding rate of 80 years 
old (Fig. 2). According to the average life expectancy 
in the examined countries, Egypt (70.5) and Tajiki-
stan (74.5) are the ones closest to Russia. 
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Figure2. Average life expectancy (years) throughout the world in 2017. 
From: Rosstat. Section “International Comparisons –Demographics”. 
http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstatmain/rosstat/ru/statistics/icstatistics/incomparisons/# 
What is more, life expectancy at birth is the most 
important indicator of the quality of life, which is 
determined, among other factors, by different types 
of inequality and reflects the life potential of popula-
tion. The latter is estimated for a number of people 
regarding their lived or aggregate time [2]. The num-
ber of people can become smaller with a greater 
number of years lived and, therefore, higher capabili-
ties. It is a historically new phenomenon when most 
people live a long life and remain healthy for such a 
long period. In the context of the decreasing popula-
tion growth in Russia later transforming into a stable 
natural decline it is crucial to explore ways of main-
taining and increasing the life potential of society 
(primarily to increase the length of a healthy life). 
Actually, the new national project “Demographics” 
(the implementation period from January 01, 2019 to 
December 31, 2024) developed by the Government of 
the Russian Federation in accordance with the Decree 
of the President of the Russian Federation of July 05, 
2018 is aimed at setting a new threshold of healthy 
life at67 years old. Such a goal increases the role of 
health care as a social institution for maintaining 
health and working capacity of the population. The 
long stagnation in Russian health care system leads to 
enormous losses in the life potential of the popula-
tion. Such losses affect all its main components: the 
total working life and the total lifetime in both eco-
nomically active and economically inactive condi-
tion. It should be said that a long-term natural popula-
tion decline increases the effect of an unfavorable age 
structure of mortality, which leads to a drop in the 
country’s life potential. This is precisely the situation 
that was observed in Russia in the period from the 
1990s to the early 2000s. Dynamics of life expectan-
cy at birth (Y) in the Russian Federation from 1990 to 
2017 is presented in Figure 3. 
 
Figure3. Dynamics of life expectancy at birth in the Russian Federation in 1990–2017,years. 
We built an econometric model to identify the most 
significant factors affecting life expectancy in the 
Russian Federation. This model includes the panel 
data of the regional statistics for the period from 2013 
to 2017 (380 = 76 regions × 5 years of observations) 
characterizing the indicators of economic develop-
ment, ecological environment, social inequality, de-
formation of the social behavior of the population, 
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education and health care. We excluded Moscow, St. 
Petersburg, and the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug as 
anomalous observations (outliers), and replaced the 
missing values with averages (the Chechen Republic, 
the Ingushetia Republic, Sevastopol, and the Repub-
lic of Crimea). To identify the structure of the rela-
tionships between the variables (their classification), 
to reduce the data and the correlation between the 
explanatory variables and to minimize the risk of 
losing factors that are statistically insignificant inat-
test, we built a multiple regression equation using the 
algorithm of a step-by-step analysis for the main 
components. Before that for each group of factors we 
estimated integral indices (main components) as line-
ar combinations of normalized exogenous variables, 
reflecting the latent core characteristics of each of the 
factor groups (Table 2). 
Table2. Factors affecting life expectancy in the Russian Federation 
Integral Index Indicator 
Economic development Labor force, thousand people  
GRP per capita PPP, USD  
Average per capita cash income per month, rub  
Gini coefficient  
Unemployment rate,%  
Excessive inequality and 
deformation of social 
behavior 
Share of household expenditures on alcohol and tobacco products, %  
Share of household expenditures on non-food items, %  
Number of recorded crimes per 100,000 people  
Number of crimes committed by minors and with their complicity per capita  
Number of murders and attempted murders per capita  
The share of population with incomes below the subsistence minimum, %  
Share of urban population, %  
Ecological environment The volume of emissions into the atmosphere from stationary sources, thousand tons 
per 1 km2  
Screening of air polluting substances from stationary sources, thousand tons per 
1km2  
Discharge of polluted wastewater into surface water bodies, mlnm3 per 1 km2  
Education as a source and 
transmitter of knowledge 
and spiritual values 
Share of children enrolled in preschool education,% 
of the number of children of the relevant age  
Share of household expenditures on education, %  
Number of students enrolled in training programs for skilled workers and employees 
per 10,000 people, persons  
Share of university students in the population, %  
Healthcare as a social 
institution for maintaining 
health and working ca-
pacity of the population 
Relative morbidity of the population  
Share of doctors per capita  
Medical staff per capita  
Share of household expenditures on health care, %  
Infant mortality rate  
Finally, we obtained models of the following integral 
characteristics for several significant components: 
Economic development (the first main component):  
= 0.311 ∙ + 0.482 ∙ + 0.534 ∙
+ 0.247 ∙ − 
−0.189 ∙ , = 65.45 %        (1) 
Excessive inequality and deformation of the social 
behavior of the population (the second main compo-
nent): 
= −0.012 ∙ + 0.182 ∙ − 0.014 ∙ −
0.04 ∙ − 0.019 ∙ − 0.319 ∙ +
   +0.584 , =
64.75 %                                                                                                    
(2) 
Ecological environment (the first main component): 
= −0.491 ∙ + 0.512 ∙ − 0.157 ∙
, = 72.45 %   (3) 
Education as a source and transmitter of knowledge 
and spiritual values (the second main component): 
= 0.711 ∙ + 0.382 ∙ + 0.144 ∙ −
0.047 ∙ , = 58.75 % (4) 
Healthcare as a social institution for maintaining 
health and working capacity of the population (the 
second main component):  
= −0.254 ∙ + 0.272 ∙ + 0.178 ∙
+ 0.487 ∙ − 
−  0.504 ∙ , = 57.48 %                             (5) 
The cumulative (accumulated) percentage of total 
variance for each group exceeds ≥ 57%. 
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In accordance with the given integral characteristics 
(equations 1–5), the regression equation on the main 
components will have the following form: 
= 60.211 + 0.012 + 0.251 + 0.114 +
0.008 + 0.237 +                (6) 
It should be noted that the obtained regression equa-
tion (6) has a high explanatory power (adjusted de-
termination coefficient Ṝ2= 0.914).According to the t-
test, the parameters of the constructed regression are 
reliable at the significance level = 0.1.  The calcula-
tions in the constructed multiple regression equation 
allowed us to draw some conclusions. Excessive so-
cial inequality, deformation of social behavior of 
people, and the condition of the healthcare system 
have the greatest direct effect on life expectancy at 
birth in the Russian Federation. Environmental condi-
tions, economic factors, and education are less influ-
ential. The latter can be explained by the fact that 
economic growth has an indirect influence on life 
expectancy through factors related to the healthcare 
system, education, and social inequality. Ecological 
environment and access to education influence aver-
age life expectancy with a certain delay, that is, by 
investing resources in ecology and developing the 
education system now, it is possible to increase the 
average life expectancy after a certain period of time. 
Thus, the constructed equation of multiple regression 
reflecting the relationship of life expectancy and var-
ious economic, social and environmental factors, in 
our opinion, can be considered as a scientific and 
methodological basis for identifying priority areas 
and developing measures necessary to improve de-
mographic dynamics and increase life potential of 
people in Russia. 
4. Discussion 
Persistent negative trends in the demographics of new 
Russia are caused, to a large extent, by excessive 
inequality and large-scale poverty. They cannot be 
overcome without an effective state social and eco-
nomic policy. Given the current practice of the lead-
ing countries in implementing the UN Development 
Program that has been actively introduced for more 
than 20 years, scientific developments related to re-
distribution and demographic policies, as well as spe-
cific features of poverty in Russia, we can claim that 
this policy should include “active industrial policy—
progressive taxation—targeted social support of the 
poor and socially vulnerable groups” [24]. In modern 
Russia, active industrial policy should involve accel-
erated neo-industrial modernization of the econo-
my—digital, knowledge-intensive, and technotronic. 
Its qualitative measure is a progressive change in the 
nature of labor and employment, accompanied by a 
smaller share of physical labor and a larger share of 
mental labor, and then the latter should become mas-
sive and predominant. Its quantitative measure is the 
share of automated, digitized jobs in the national 
economy, primarily in material production that en-
sure the growth of labor productivity and decent pay 
for the latter [27]. In this context, the new industriali-
zation in Russia is of fundamental importance as it 
can reverse such a negative trend as growing eco-
nomic inactivity and dependency among the working-
age population against the background of weak moti-
vation to work. Such a policy would contribute to 
improving the quality of human potential and increas-
ing incomes, expanding (in accordance with the con-
cept of A. Sen) people’s functional capabilities, in-
cluding “the ability to avoid premature death”, “have 
children”, etc. An effective redistribution policy is 
the most important condition for solving demograph-
ic problems in the context of high social inequality 
[28, 29]. The experience of the leading economies 
clearly demonstrates the potential of various mecha-
nisms of income redistribution and, primarily, pro-
gressive taxation. Since 2001, Russia has abandoned 
this approach to taxation and practices a single tax 
rate on personal income of 13%. We agree with those 
experts who believe that a single tax multiplies ex-
cessive inequality, when incomes of the poor de-
crease, while the rich are becoming richer. These 
researchers also substantiate the need for introducing 
a progressive income tax scale. Considering the fact 
that social inequality and poverty have crucial influ-
ence on the demographic dynamics in modern Russia, 
it seems viable to consider the so-called functional 
fertility border as the methodological basis when 
constructing a progressive taxation scale [3]. In other 
words, it is a threshold level of per capita income 
above which the reproductive function can be effec-
tively performed. If the average per capita income 
exceeds the functional fertility border, it is subject to 
a “demographic tax” in accordance with the estab-
lished rates. The amount of taxes collected in this 
way is redistributed between those whose per capita 
income is below this functional border proportionally 
to the difference between the border and the income 
(income deficit). Such a tax, of course, is progressive: 
with a higher percentage-wise income there is a 
greater difference between the latter and the func-
tional fertility border, and it would be practically zero 
for income close to the functional boundary [30]. At 
the same time, the targeted social support programs 
for the poor and people with a high risk of poverty 
should be more closely connected with family life 
cycles and include a combination of incentive 
measures for self-sufficiency and cash benefits. For 
example, in modern Russia these can be regional “so-
cial contract” programs increasing self-sufficiency of 
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families, paying monthly allowances from unused 
maternity capital, etc. This would increase the coun-
try’s social protection of poor families with children. 
In addition, the demographic situation in Russia can 
also be improved by shifting focus to traditional 
family values and promoting a healthy lifestyle. 
These measures should be implemented at different 
levels (from school courses to feature films, TV ad-
vertising and stories in the media). Another signifi-
cant factor is a campaign against alcohol abuse, drug 
addiction, mortality at work and road accidents, 
which emphasizes the growing role of the social 
sphere in improving the quality of life, and, conse-
quently, in fulfilling people’s basic and social func-
tional capabilities. 
5. Conclusion 
Depopulation processes in new Russia are not detri-
mental. The combined effect of an active industrial 
policy (economic growth) and the measures of in-
come redistribution can improve the demographic 
dynamics, ensure positive natural population growth 
annually, and increase the life potential of the socie-
ty—the key criteria for ensuring the demographic 
security of the country. 
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